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LABOR LAW IN MISSOURIP
AusTmN F. SnuT-**
During the past legal year, the number of cases dealing with labor
relations with which the appellant courts of Missouri have had to deal
have increased considerably over like periods of previous years. The cases
show no particular trend one way or the other and appear to deal with
just about every facet of labor relations.
Glidewell v. Hughey,1 was a declaratory judgment action to deter-
mine the power of the city of Springfield, Mlissouri, to enter into col-
lective bargaining agreements with labor unions. The case involved the
Board of Public Utilities of Springfield, and revolved around a deter-
mination of whether the duties of that particular board were legislative
in nature or proprietary. Plaintiffs, officers and members of the petition-
ing union, argued that the functions of the Board of Public Utilities,
under Springfield's constitution charter, were proprietary in nature and
therefore subject to collective bargaining. The city contended otherwise.
The court stated that "the real issue is whether or not, under the city's
present charter, wages, hours and working conditions of city employees
in its electric and transportation systems can be a matter of bargaining
and contract to any extent at all."'2
After examining the pertinent provisions of the charter, the court
came to the conclusion that the employees of the Board of Public Utili-
ties were clearly subject to and regulated by the exercise of the legislative
powers of the city. This was based on the fact that the city council has
the final decision on the utilities budget, rates and disbursements and may
even abolish the Board or transfer its duties to other departments. The
court felt that the Board was only an administrative body, a department
of the city government, with certain legislative powers delegated to it
by the charter.
*This Article contains a discussion of selected 1958 and 1959 Missouri court
decisions.
**Attorney, Kansas City; AB., University of Missouri, 1950, LL.B., 1952.
1. 314 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. 1958) (en banc).
2. Id. at 753.
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This was differentiated from the separation referred to in City of
Springfield v. Clouse,3 and State ex rel. Moore v. Julian.4 In those cases,
the functions and setup of the departments in question were considered
proprietary in nature, rather than legislative. Thus employer and em-
ployee relations chould be handled on a basis similar to private industry.
The court stated:
As we held in the Clouse case, § 29, Art. I, Constitution, does not
confer any collective bargaining rights upon public officers or
employees in their relations with municipal government and we
hold that it is not applicable to the situation in this case because
there is no such separation of the public utilities of the city from
its general governmental functions and legislative powers as
would be required to make it applicable. Therefore, our conclu-
sion is that under the present charter of the city the whole matter
of qualifications, tenure, compensation and working conditions
of the city's public utilities involves the exercise of legislative
powers and cannot become a matter of bargaining and contract.
As to the jurisdiction of the State Board of Mediation, we
think it must be held that it has no jurisdiction in municipalities
in which there is no separation of municipally owned public
utilities with provision for their operation in some manner dis-
tinctly apart from other city functions so that their employer
and employee relations could be handled on a basis similar to
private industry.5
The case of Swift & Co. v. Doe6 involved a restraining order issued
against stranger picketing. The court stated the proposition as follows:
The principle question is whether peaceful, orderly stranger
picketing of the premises of an employer engaged in interstate
commerce, the object of which is to force, coerce and intimidate
unorganized employees to join a union or to force, coerce and in-
timidate an employer, by economic pressure, to force, coerce and
intimidate the employees to join a union, is an unfair labor prac-
tice within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Re-
lations Board, withdrawn under the doctrine of pre-emption
from the orbit of state control, or whether such picketing is out-
3. 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947) (en bane).
4. 359 Mo. 539, 222 S.W.2d 720 (1949) (en bane).
5. 314 S.W.2d at 756.
6. 315 S.W.2d 465 (St. L. Ct. App. 1958).
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side the field of federal pre-emption and therefore subject to
regulation by a state equity court under state law.7
The case was originally taken to the supreme court, but it was
transferred to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, because of the lack of the
supreme court's appellate jurisdiction.8
The court held that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to issue the
injunction, since Congress had preempted the field in labor relation
matters affecting interstate commerce and has vested exclusive juris-
diction in the National Labor Relations Board to determine labor dis-
putes involving unfair labor practices which are either protected or
prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act.9
This case is similar to Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,1° in that
Swift had alleged unfair labor practices. The labor board had refused
to issue a complaint. The law is pretty well establish by this time that
the refusal of the regional director to issue a complaint does not revest
jurisdiction of the state courts on that ground alone. This can only be
done where, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 160 (a), the NLRB has ceded
jurisdiction to the state in instances where the state has a labor manage-
ment relations act of its own. Of course, Missouri does not have such an
act. The court recognized that in this instance, where the NLRB refuses
to act, and the state cannot act, there is a so-called no man's land created.
This situation could be cured in Missouri by the legislature adopting new
labor laws which are in conformity with federal laws, in other words,
by enacting a management relations act of its own along the lines of the
federal act."1
The case of State v. Local 8-6, Oil Workers,'2 is a landmark case
in Missouri concerning the constitutionality of the King-Thompson Act.13
7. Id. at 467.
8. See Swift & Co. v. Doe, 311 S.W.2d 15 (Mo. 1958).
9. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1952). See Guss v. Utah Labor
Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953);
Webster v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955); Graybar Elec. Co. v. Auto-
motive Union, 365 Mo. 753, 287 S.W.2d 794 (1956); Cooper v. Stufflebeam, 365 Mo. 250,
280 S.W.2d 832 (1955) (en bane).
10. 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
11. After this Article was written legislation was enacted which in large part
eliminates the no man's land problem. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, 73 Stat 519, 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws No. 14 § 701.
12. 317 S.W.2d 309 (Mo. 1958) (en banc).
13. §§ 295.010-210, RSMo 1949.
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The defendant union had appealed from the judgment of the circuit court
of the City of St. Louis enjoining them from continuing and participating
in a work stoppage and strike against the Laclede Gas Company of the
State of Missouri. Under the provisions of the King-Thompson Act, the
state of Missouri had seized control of the public utility on July 5, 1956,
five days after the strike began. This was done on the theory that the
strike jeopardized the public interest, health and welfare. Daniel C.
Rogers, Chairman of the Missouri State Board of Mediation, was desig-
nated as the agent of the Governor of Missouri in carrying out the
provisions of the executive order seizing the utility. The striking
employees refused to return to work until after the circuit court of St.
Louis had issued its restraining order enjoining them from continuing
the strike.
The union argued that the King-Thompson Act was unconstitutional
because of its conflict with the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, as
amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.14 The court
stated that the constitutionality of the act was in issue in the case of
State ex rel. State Bd. of Mediation v. Pigg,15 in which case the court
held that the act was severable, particularly those sections directly
affecting the State Board of Mediation, its legal existence, powers and
duties.
The court reviewed the fact that the primary purpose of the King-
Thompson Act is to protect the welfare and health of the people when
threatened by the interruption of services of utilities operating under
governmental franchise or permit or under governmental ownership or
control. The services provided by the act are not forced upon the parties,
but are merely made available to them. The court stated:
The right of a state to regulate and control public utilities operat-
ing within its borders is inherent and is referable to the police
powers. Statutes with respect thereto being remedial should
be liberally construed.16
The court stated further:
A strike or lockout which jeopardizes the public health,
safety or interest is not a protected activity under the Labor
14. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1952).
15. 362 Mo. 798, 244 S.W.2d 75 (1951) (en banc).
16. 317 S.W.2d at 316.
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Management Relations Act, 1947, Sec. 1(b) of the Act, 29
U.S.C.A. Sec. 141(b) provides: 'Industrial strife which inter-
feres with the normal flow of commerce and with the full pro-
duction of articles and commodities for commerce, can be
avoided or substantially minimized if employers, employees, and
labor organizations each recognize under law one another's
legitimate rights in their relations with each other, and above all
recognize under law that neither party has any right in its
relations with any other to engage in acts or practices which
jeopardize the public health, safety or interest. 61 Stat. 136....
This congressional declaration clearly indicates a purpose to sub-
ordinate such 'acts and practices' to the public health, safety and
interest. By the use of the term 'under law' state laws must have
been intended as well as federal laws because historically and
traditionally the state governments has been vested with the
protection of the public health, safety and interest under their
general police powers. 17
Of course, the United States Supreme Court early recognized
that violations of local laws enacted for the preservation of property
rights and personal safety were not within the protection of the federal
act.1 8
The union argued that this case was ruled by the case of Amalga-
mated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd.19 The court disagreed. In that case, the Wisconsin act provided for
compulsory arbitration while the King-Thompson Act provides for com-
pulsory mediation. In Wisconsin, the parties were required to accept
the findings of the Wisconsin board, while in Missouri the parties are not
required to accept the findings of the mediation board.
The union next argued that the King-Thompson Act was in violation
of article I, section 29 of the constitution of Missouri, arguing that the
right to bargain collectively includes the right to strike. Secion 29
provides "that employees shall have the right to organize and to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing." The court
stated that the King-Thompson Act does not abolish the right of utility
employees to strike, but only subordinates that right to the public interest.
17. Id. at 319.
18. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939); International
Union UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
19. 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
1959]
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The union further argued that the section of the King-Thompson Act
which provides for seizure 20 is an unlawful delegation of legislative
powers violative of article IE, section 1, of the constitution of Missouri,
in that it does not provide sufficient standards and guides for carrying
out the seizure provisions of the act. The court stated:
It is not necessary that statutes prescribe a rule of action where
they deal with situations which require the vesting of discretion
in a public officer such as where the discretion relates to a police
regulation and is necessary to protect the public health, safety
and welfare.... [Citing cases.] 2 '
All other arguments of the union, including one of involuntary
servitude, were rejected by the court as without foundation.
Thus, the supreme court has upheld the constitutionality of the
more controversial sections of the King-Thompson Act. Despite the
fact that there are many ways in which the King-Thompson Act could be
improved, down through the years it would be difficult to point out
specific instances where the application of the act has harmed or hurt
any legitimate labor or management objective. In fact, in some instances,
at least, the application of the seizure provisions of the act would
seem to be looked upon with relief by labor as well as by management.
Despite their protestations to the contrary, the prospect of a long and
costly strike is not looked upon with any great amount of pleasure by
labor officials.
The case of Anderson v. Deering22 was a declaratory judgment action
to determine whether employees of the Refuse Collection Division of
the City of St. Louis were entitled to overtime on a weekly basis or
on a yearly employment cycle basis.
The facts showed that the employees concerned worked in excess of
forty hours per week during some weeks, and worked less than forty
hours a week during other weeks, but always received the same pay
whether working more or less. Because of the irregular hours of collec-
tion per week, it was determined that overtime or compensatory time
off should be computed on a yearly cycle basis of 2080 hours during each
20. § 295180, RSMo 1949.
21. 317 S.W.2d at 323-24.
22. 318 S.W.2d 383 (St. L. Ct. App. 1958).
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employment cycle. This included eight hours credit for certain specified
holidays.
The court found that there was nothing wrong with the setting up
of an employment cycle on a yearly basis and stated:
The reasonableness of establishing the 'employment cycle' on
an annual basis becomes evident when the nature and the
amount of work required is subject to variance in the amount of
rubbish to be collected from time to time and the other circum-
stances testified to by Derring. As pointed out by defendants in
the instances when the work-load is constant one week may be
the employment cycle but it is otherwise when the work-load
varies for various reasons.
When construing an ordinance enacted by a municipal
legislative body it is our duty to ascertain the intent of that
body, and to do so, if possible, from the language used. Christy
v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122.23
Thus, the court upheld that overtime should be payable only after the
number of hours required in the annual employment cycle.
The case of Pfitzinger Mortuary, Inc. v. Dill,2 4 was another declara-
tory judgment action to determine the validity of a clause in a proposed
contract between a labor union and a corporation providing that only
licensed embalmers who were members of the union could embalm the
dead. The clause had been upheld by the lower court as a lawful
objective of the union. The company argued that the clause was against
the public policy of the state of Missouri and constituted an unlawful
demand.
In prior contracts, there had been a clause to the effect that the
funeral director, or owner of the mortuary, could also do embalming
provided he was a licensed embalmer. But in the contract in question,
this clause was removed and plaintiff funeral director would be pro-
hibited from personally doing any embalming.
The company sought to bring itself within the rule which restricts
otherwise lawful union activities which improperly coerce or affect the
owner of a small business who conducts his business without outside help
and does all or part of the work himself. This rule is based on the public
23. Id. at 386.
24. 319 S.W.2d 575 (Mo. 1958).
1959]
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policy of the State of Missouri, in the encouragement of small busi-
nesses.2 5
In analysing the case, the court said "in balancing the rights the
state courts may not proscribe the union's activities 'merely by setting
artifical bounds, unreal in the light of modern circumstances, to what
constitutes an industrial relationship or a labor dispute.' "26
In holding that the proposed contract clause was valid, the court
stated:
In view of the court's limitations in declaring public policy
in this field, in the absence of legislative policy and statutes
governing employer-employee labor relationships, in view of the
basic theory of the exempting small-businessman doctrine, and
balancing, in these particular circumstances, one constitutional
right against the other, it may not be said that the proposed con-
tract is unlawful or that it improperly and unfairly infringes
fundamental constitutional guaranties and is therefore contrary
to the state's manifest public policy and should be enjoined.27
This appears to be a well reasoned, common sense decision. Aside
from its legal implications in the field of contract negotiating, it will
also be a source of great comfort to union members to know that when
they prepare to pass into the great beyond, no non-union hand will
interfere.
ACF Industries v. Industrial Comm'n 8 involved a claim for benefits
under the employment security law. The particular employee concerned
had been employed by ACF Industries, and had been covered by a col-
lective bargaining agreement while so employed providing for certain
rights on layoff and recall. The contract provided that any employee who
does not report to work within five days after being called back to work,
notice having been sent to his last known address, can be discharged.
In the case at hand, the employee had been laid off. Subsequently thereto,
he moved from the home in which he had been living at the time of his
layoff without informing the company. The company thereafter sent him
notice to report back to work, but the employee did not receive this
25. Heath v. Motion Picture Mach. Operators, 365 Mo. 934, 290 S.W.2d 152 (1956);
Hughes v. Kansas City Motion Picture Mach. Operators, 282 Mo. 304, 221 S.W. 95
(1920) (en banc).
26. 319 S.W.2d at 578.
27. Id. at 582.
28. 320 S.W.2d 484 (Mo. 1959) (en banc).
[Vol. 24
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notice until more than five days had passed. After the five day period,
the company discharged the employee. Thereafter, he applied for and
was awarded unemployment benefits. Although the employee went to
the company to seek employment after the five day period, the company
refused to put him back to work. The Industrial Commission found that
the claimant employee had not failed without good cause to accept
suitable work offered by the employer.
The court found that the employee, although laid off, continued to
be an employee of the company until his discharge after the five days
notification.
The Commission argued that the claimant could only be held
ineligible for benefits if he had failed without good cause to accept suit-
able work when offered and such offer actually had been communicated
to him. The court thought otherwise stating:
However, we think that rule has no application in the instant
case. In order to secure to claimant the right of recall to work
following layoff (which he did not have in the absence of con-
tract), his bargaining agent, the union, procured for him such
right by inclusion of the seniority provisions set forth in Article
IX of the contract. In return for that concession, appellant was
granted the privilege of terminating those rights if claimant
failed to report for work within five days after notice of recall
was mailed to him at his last known address. The reason for and
propriety of such provisions are obvious. Without them, any
laid-off employee would be enabled by his own neglect or voli-
tional refusal to receive his mail to retain the benefits of seniority
granted him under the contract and at the same time deprive his
employer of the right to employ another servant to render the
services for which the laid-off employee was needed.29
The court felt that the employee by not picking up his mail at his
old address had volitionally violated the labor contract, and was subject
to discharge. When he was discharged for cause, he thereby became
ineligible for benefit under the act.
The case of United Brick v. Wilkinson 0 was an action by the com-
pany for an injunction to restrain the defendant unions from picketing its
29. Id. at 492.
30. 325 S.W.2d 50 (K.C. Ct. App. 1959).
1959]
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plant. The unions stipulated that the company was involved in interstate
commerce as defined by the National Labor Relations Act,31 and
further, that it met the jurisdictional standards of the National Labor
Relations Board. The background of the case appears to involve a
jurisdictional dispute between employees employed by the plaintiff and
represented by District No. 50, United Mine Workers, and the defendant
unions who wished to organize the same employees.
The gist of the unions' case was that the matters involved were
within the jurisdiction of the NLRB, and that the state courts have no
jurisdiction to hear the matter. The court accepted the fact that the
purpose of the picketing by the rival unions was to coerce the employer
and the employees to accept their unions.
In attempting to determine whether or not such picketing should be
restrained by the state court, the court stated that such coercive picketing
had many times been held to violate the free choice guaranteed to em-
ployees by article I, section 29, constitution of Missouri.32 But the court
concluded:
Appellant Unions insist that Congress has pre-empted the field
and delegated exclusive jurisdiction to the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, thus leaving to the state courts only authority,
under police power, to restrain violence. Rather reluctantly,
and in conformity with decisions of the highest court of the
land we agree generally with appellants' position. 33
In reviewing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmnon,84 the court
interprets the case as follows:
(1) State courts may enjoin and grant compensation for conduct
marked by violence and imminent threat to the public order.
(2) State courts may neither enjoin nor grant compensation if
the conduct is either prohibited or protected by the Act. (a) This
is so even though the Board refuses to accept jurisdiction;
(b) This is so if the conduct is 'fairly debatable' as either pro-
tected or prohibited.
(3) The majority opinion holds or at least strongly intimates
31. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1952).
32. Quinn v. Buchanan, 298 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1957) (en banc); Bellerive Country
Club v. McVey, 365 Mo. 477, 284 S.W.2d 492 (1955) (en banc); Tallman Co. v. Latel,
365 Mo. 552, 284 S.W.2d 547 (1955) (en banc).
33. 325 S.W.2d at 52.
34. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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(and four justices so construed it) that state courts are power-
less to act even though the activities are 'neither protected nor
prohibited'a 5
Many of the labor cases over the past years in Missouri point out
the desirability of some type of overall labor management relations act
to be enacted on a state level. Labor board proceedings are cumber-
some at best and time consuming. Both labor and management should
be entitled to a timely decision on their cases, something botli are denied
in many areas at the present time. Since, under federal law as set out in
this Article, the NLRB can cede jurisdiction to a state agency should it
not desire to assume jurisdiction itself, this would seem to be a desirable
means of arriving at a more satisfactory conclusion. Many times, labor
and management tactics in the field of labor relations border more on
the law of the jungle than on the law of the land. Many of the problems
posed could be avoid by a fair, well thought out labor management code
for Missouri.
35. 325 S.W.2d at 55.
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